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O1IO CONSTITUTION
Initiative and Referendum
Carter v. Celebrezze, 63 Ohio St. 2d 326, 410 N.E.2d 1249 (1980)
A T THE BEGINNING of the twentieth century, the process of popular legis-
lation through the use of initiative and referendum measures gained
popularity in the United States. It was during this period that twelve states,
including Ohio, adopted the measures of initiative and referendum. 1 Theo-
dore Roosevelt advocated the adoption of these measures at the Ohio
Constitutional Convention of 1912 where the Ohio legislature enacted
provisions for the use of these methods of popular legislation.2
The initiative is a "political device" whereby the people may enact
laws directly, rather than indirectly through their representative legis-
lators,' and adopt constitutional amendments.' The process in Ohio
briefly is this: a written petition signed by 100 electors with a summary
is submitted to the Attorney General, who verifies it as fair and truthful;
the verified copy of the summary and the proposed amendment are filed
with the Secretary of State,5 who designates the form of the petition; the
petitioner then solicits the signatures of ten percent of the electorate., Each
part-petition must contain "a full and correct copy of the title, and the
text of the law, section or item thereof sought to be referred, or the pro-
posed law or proposed amendment to the constitution.8
To facilitate the power of the people to amend the constitution through
the initiative, the framers provided that the petitions "shall be presumed
to be in all respects sufficient. . . .The foregoing provisions of this section
shall be self-executing."' This section also provides "[1laws may be passed
to facilitate their operation, but in no way limiting or restricting either such
provisions or the powers herein reserved."'" The legislature has enacted
sections of the Revised Code implementing the initiative process, regarding
lFordham & Leach, The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 OHio ST. L.J. 495, 496
(1950).
2 1 OmO CONSTITUTIONAL CONvENTiON 1912, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES 378, 379; Fordham
& Leach, supra note 1, at 497.
8Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 Ohio St. 473, 477, 104 N.E. 529, 530 (1913).
4 Omo CONST. art. IH, § 1.
I OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3519.01 (Page Supp. 1979).
8 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3519.05 (Page Supp. 1979).
T OHIo CoNsr. art. II, § la.
B id. § 1g.
0ld.
10 Id.
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its form, verification, duties of the Secretary of State and duties of the
boards of elections."
In the January term of 1980, the Ohio Supreme Court in a per curiam
opinion denied a writ of mandamus which would have compelled the Sec-
retary of State to accept part-petitions from a committee representing peti-
tioners who had proposed a constitutional amendment relating to the es-
tablishment of congressional and state legislative districts."2 The committee
attempted to file with the Secretary of State for placement on the ballot
part-petitions which contained an excess of the required ten percent of
the electorate, 3 "Exhibit A" containing 84,825 signatures and "Exhibit B"
containing 257,182 signatures. " Although both petition forms stated the
full text of the proposed amendment, and all the language to be added,
modified or deleted, the part-petitions entitled Exhibit A failed to reproduce
within the text one phrase in section 13 of article XI which was to remain
unaltered by the proposed amendment.' 5
Relators argued that this irregularity was superficial, and that addi-
tionally, the Secretary of State was procedurally incorrect in not first for-
warding these part-petitions to the various boards of elections, advising
relators of the insufficiency of signatures, 8 and allowing them ten days
to procure sufficient signatures." In a close decision, the court refuted
these arguments, cautioning against nondisclosure, extolling the right of
informed choice by the electorate and declaring that the part-petitions
actually represented two different proposed amendments; consequently,
the Secretary of State had no duties under section 1 g of article II of the Ohio
Constitution to forward the part-petitions to the boards of elections."
Justice William B. Brown in his concurring opinion, feared the prece-
dential effect of holding for the relators on the basis of superficial error and
the policy of liberality when reviewing the initiative process. 9 He cautioned
against giving the Secretary of State the discretionary authority to ignore
11 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3519.04-22 (Page 1972 & Supp. 1979).
1 Carter v. Celebrezze, 63 Ohio St. 2d 326, 410 N.E.2d 1249 (1980).
18 Id. at 326-327, 410 N.E.2d at 1249. Ten percent of the electorate of the state at the time
of the filing with the Secretary of State was 284,336.
14 Id. at 327, 410 N.E.2d at 1249.
15 OHio CoNsT. art. 11, § 1g.
16 63 Ohio St. at 327, 410 N.E.2d at 1250.
7 Id. Omo CoNsT. art. II, § 1g, grants petitioners ten additional days to file "additional sig-
natures." This wording was interpreted in Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E.2d
907 (1939) to limit the ten day grant to cases where the petitions and part-petitions are
"thus/verified" according to the Constitution but where signatures were voided for other
reasons.
18 63 Ohio St. 326, 410 N.E.2d 1249 (1980).
"1l4d at 329, 410 N.E.2d at 1251 (Brown, W., concurring).
[Vol. 15:1
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some errors and not others, and noted his preference for a guiding standard
which could "be uniformly and consistently applied.""0
Justice Dowd, writing for the dissent, charged the majority with ele-
vating form over substance, and emphasized the provisions of the Ohio
Constitution which provide that the initiative process shall be self-executing, 2
and that laws passed by the legislature may facilitate this process, but in
no way limit or restrict it. 2 He pointed to the seminal decision of Thrailkill
v. Smith"2 which declared that "it is the plain duty of the courts in constru-
ing the constitutional provisions to give them such construction as will
facilitate rather than obstruct their operation. 2' Additionally, the con-
stitution sets only minimal requirements of form for the petition which
were met by the relators in the instant case: full title and text of the pro-
posed amendment, with the caption "Be it Resolved by the People of the
State of Ohio." 5 The test suggested by Justice Dowd was "whether a peti-
tioner could have been misled by the omission in the proposed amendment.""
In applying the test to the facts in this case, he concluded that the "omitted
language is not particularly germane to the proposed amendment."2
In contradiction to the majority, the dissent urged that there are times
when it is necessary for the Secretary of State to use his discretionary powers
when reviewing errors in form." The Revised Code delineates his powers
and duties to "[r]eceive all initiative and referendum petitions on state
questions and issues and determine and certify to the sufficiency of such
petitions."2 9 An opinion by the Attorney General on the subject of his
powers suggests that the Secretary of State may regulate the conduct of
elections in such a way as will not amplify the laws of Ohio, but will be in
harmony with the intent and purpose of such laws and rulings of the
courts, and opinions of the Attorney General. 0 The county boards of elec-
tions must follow his rules, regulations, and instructions."1
The Secretary of State has the duty to separate part-petitions by county
and send them to the county boards of elections for verification of the
20 Id. at 329-330, 410 N.E.2d at 1251.
21 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1g.
22 63 Ohio St. at 331, 410 N.E.2d at 1252 (Dowd, dissenting).
23 106 Ohio St. 1, 138 N.E. 532 (1922).
24 Id. at 5, 138 N.E. at 533.
25 Omo CoNST. art. II, § Ig.
26 63 Ohio St. at 331, 410 N.E.2d at 1252 (Dowd, dissenting).
27 Id.
28 Id.
99 Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 3501.05(J).
80 1 Op. Arr'y GEN. OHIo 120, 121 (1930).
B1 Id.
RECENT CASES
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validity and sufficiency of the signatures.' The supreme court has held
that the Secretary is not empowered to hold proceedings on the sufficiency
of petitions until after they are returned from the county boards of election.'
A subsequent decision held that the Secretary of State has the power to
reject parts of petitions containing signatures not verified with an affidavit
by petitioner.'4 Citing the presumptively sufficient provision of section ig
of article II, a local court of appeals described his duty as an "absolute
duty... irrespective of whether it can be proved that in some way some or
all the signatures contained in the initiative petition are invalid.""5 In a
more recent opinion, the supreme court noted that any discrepancy be-
tween the language of the documents submitted to the Attorney General and
the language of the text of the proposed constitutional amendment does
not affect the duty of the Secretary of State to submit the proposal to the vote
of the electorate if it is signed by the required ten percent."
Various states have classified an official's determination of the suffi-
ciency of a petition as judicial,"7 or as ministerial.' The Ohio Supreme
Court has stated that although the Secretary of State in determining the
sufficiency of the petition will necessarily act in a quasi-judicial capacity,
the placing of the issues on the ballot is a ministerial function and not
quasi-judicial in nature. In its consideration of a writ of mandamus, which
the court described as an extraordinary measure to be issued only with great
caution, it was held that in an initiative petition where the summary was
longer by one word than the amendment itself, the relator had failed to
show that the Secretary of State abused his discretion by allowing the
election, or that he usurped any quasi-judicial power."
What, then, is an abuse of discretion? When the manner and method
are not described in detail as to how the Secretary of State should proceed,
he should exercise "fair and impartial official discretion."'" The self-execut-
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3519.15 (Page Supp. 1979).
B3McCrehen v. Brown, 108 Ohio St. 454, 141 N.E. 69 (1923).
" 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E.2d 907 (1939). See also Tulley v. Brown, 31 Ohio St. 2d 188, 190,
287 N.E.2d 630, 631 (1972) (stating that there is no duty on the part of the Secretary of
State to transmit improperly verified part-petitions to boards of elections).
35 Durrell v. Brown, 29 Ohio App. 2d 133, 141, 279 N.E.2d 624, 629 (1971).
3e Schwartz v. Brown, 32 Ohio St. 2d 4, 288 N.E.2d 821 (1972).
31Coyte v. King, 11 N.J. Misc. 777, 168 A. 158 (1933); El Paso v. Tuck, 282 S.W.2d 764
(Tex. Ct. App. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 828 (1956).
8 Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (1910).
89 O'Grady v. Brown, 48 Ohio St. 2d 17, 20, 356 N.E.2d 296, 298 (1976).
4 0 Williams v. Brown, 52 Ohio St. 2d 13, 368 N.E.2d 838 (1977).
4Hunt v. Hildebrandt, 93 Ohio St. 1, 12, 112 N.E. 138, 141 (1915), affd 241 U.S. 565
(1916).
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ing mandate of the constitution must be obeyed, but when there is doubt,
it must be "resolved by the application of the same ordinary intelligence
of men that is applied to the solution of everyday problems of life."' 2 From
the majority opinion of the instant case, it is clear that the court has still
not come to terms with the issue of whether the Secretary of State has any
discretionary powers, what those powers are, what constitutes an abuse
of discretion, or the appropriate test for abuse of discretion when the Secre-
tary of State must pass on the required formality and sufficiency of the
petitions.
As noted, Justice Dowd suggested the test of whether a petitioner could
be misled by the omission or error in the proposed amendment."' In ad-
dressing the issue of the fatality of errors on the ballot, the court in Thrailkill
suggested the test of whether "the matter printed upon the ballot . . . would
in fact mislead, or deceive, or defraud the voters."" In yet another challenge
to the form of the text printed on the ballot for a proposed constitutional
amendment, the court indicated that the test should be whether the omissions
will "interfere with a full and fair expression of the voters' choice."' 5 Men-
tioning both of these tests, the most recent supreme court decision on the
issue of omissions and errors applied the Thrailkill test, whether the errors
would mislead, deceive or defraud the voters." One may presume that this
is still the test used by the court, although this is not at all clear from the
majority opinion in Celebrezze.
On their face, the part-petitions in the instant case comply with all
the constitutional mandates. However, the Secretary of State treated them
as two separate petitions, neither meeting the ten percent requirement be-
cause of the omission of some language of an amendment intended to remain
intact. The majority denied that this was an exercise of the discretionary
power of the Secretary of State by endorsing the separate petitions theory.
The majority failed, however, to note a portion of the holding of
Greenland v. Fulton,"' a case upon which it relied in its opinion. The sub-
mission of a proposed amendment to the constitution requires "substantial
compliance" with the provisions of article II, sections la et. seq." Other
authority indicates that the intent and purpose of these provisions should
not be defeated by technical construction, but "[o]n the contrary, if the
42 93 Ohio St. at 13, 112 N.E. at 141.
43 63 Ohio St. at 331, 410 N.E.2d at 1252 (Dowd, dissenting).
" 106 Ohio St. at 11, 138 N.E. at 535.
45 Foreman v. Brown, 10 Ohio St. 2d 139, 151, 226 N.E.2d 116, 124 (1967).
46 Williams v. Brown, 52 Ohio St. 2d at 19, 368 N.E.2d at 842.
4r Grecnlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).
As ld.
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language is sufficiently plain to disclose that intent and purpose, then such
construction must obtain as will give full force and effect thereto, even
though it be attached with some difficulties."'4 The Thrailkill court echoed
this policy of liberal construction of the constitutional provisions to facilitate
the process of legislation by the electorate: "the presence of those provisions
in the Constitution clearly points the way toward liberality . . . . The
substantial thing is the expressed desire for the submission of the pro-
posal."5 Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall also cautioned
against exalting form over substance in decisions where the people's right
to petition their government is at issue: "The structure of the ballot and
the instrumentalities whereby that desire is communicated to the secretary
of state constitute formalities. It is more consonant with modem judicial
thought to pay less regard to those formalities and technicalities of pro-
cedure and to have greater regard to substance."" It is also difficult to recon-
cile the decision of the instant case with Schwartz v. Brown," where this
court denied a writ of mandamus to stop the vote by the electorate on the
initiated proposal for a state income tax. The petitions were not found
deficient even though the part-petitions, newspapers and printed ballots made
no reference to the clause in the Attorney General's summary regarding
the effective date. 3 The court held that the discrepancy did not affect the
duty of the Secretary of State to submit the proposal to a vote by the elec-
torate. The court noted the wording of section lg of article II, which creates
a presumption that the petition be considered sufficient.'
It is also difficult to reconcile the instant decision with the later case
of Williams v. Brown" where the court denied a writ of mandamus to pre-
vent a state election on an initiated proposal to amend the Constitution.
There the summary was juxtaposed on the ballot with the text of the pro-
posed amendment, the summary differed from that on the initiative petition,
the words "Be It Resolved by the People of the State of Ohio" did not appear
on the ballot, and the summary was longer than the proposed amendment.",
The alleged errors were described as harmless technical defects, and the
ballot passed the test because it did not tend to confuse or deceive."
49 93 Ohio St. at 9, 112 N.E. at 140.
50 106 Ohio St. at 5-6, 138 N.E. at 533.
01 Id. at 6, 138 N.E. 533-534 (emphasis added).
5232 Ohio St. 2d 4, 288 N.E.2d 821 (1972).
53 Id.
s4 id. at 10, 288 N.E.2d at 825.
"52 Ohio St. 2d 13, 368 N.E.2d 838 (1977).
'Id. at 18, 368 N.E.2d 842.
"Id. at 20, 368 N.E.2d 843.
(Vol. 15:1
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In view of the self-executing provision of these sections in the con-
stitution creating the right of the initiative petition, the constitutional provis-
ion that the petitions are presumptively sufficient, and the history of the
liberal construction of these provisions, facilitate the intent and purpose
of the initiative process, one would reason that the latter two decisions by
this court were more correctly decided. The closing statement of Williams
v. Brown illustrates these principles:
The people having expressly reserved to themselves the right of
the initiative, it is not the function of this court to interfere with that
right and disenfranchise the voters on the basis of some mere technical
irregularities which will not interfere with that right and disenfranchise
the voters on the choice.58
MARYANNE RACKOFF
s Id.
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